This Article discusses what the United States can do to promote the rule of law and human rights in DR Congo. This Article contends that U.S.-DR Congo policy has been formulated in dribs and drabs, limited in quantity relative to the enormity of the crisis, and without an overarching plan for promoting legal coherence and yielding long-term, systemic change. To be effective, U.S.-Congolese policy must be crafted and executed with a holistic approach-security, disarmament, infrastructure, food assistance, and health care must all undergird greater efforts to establish the rule of law. In effect, the United States must initiate an "African Marshall Plan"-a massive resource and assistance infusion to bring about wide-ranging, organic change and secure the benefits of DR Congo's free elections and the recent Nairobi/Goma peace process. To implement such an African Marshall Plan this Article advocates both procedural and substantive changes in U.S. policy toward DR Congo. Part I of the Article will place current U.S. policy in context by examining the United States' role in Congo's post-independence human rights debacle-its support of Mobutu and its shifting alliances in the African Great Lakes Region after the Cold War. Part II will consider DR Congo's continuing human rights problems after elections in 2006 and recent American piecemeal efforts to contribute to the country's peace and rebuilding process. Finally, Part III will analyze recommended changes in U.S. policy necessary to curb the ubiquitous violence and ingrained culture of impunity in DR Congo. These recommended alterations are both procedural and substantive.
[Vol. 32:1361 month, both from the conflict and the related humanitarian crisis. 5 Women are being raped in unimaginable numbers-as many as 4000 reported cases per year 6 -while militia groups fight amongst one another and torture, enslave, and murder civilians for control and exploitation of mineral resources. 7 The years of warfare have forced six million from their homes.' The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has estimated "the huge central African country has 1.1 million internally displaced people and a further 400,000 have fled abroad." 9 Thirty-eight years before the outbreak of this humanitarian disaster, the country had been trying to imagine a bright future after holding its first free elections as an independent nation. 1 0 Patrice Lumumba was elected Prime Minister and began to steer the country on a course of reform after seventy-five years of disastrous Belgian colonial rule. 1 But Lumumba, who sought aid from the Soviet Union, 2 was considered a threat to the United
States' regional interests in the Cold War. 3 And so with American and Belgian direction and backing, Lumumba was overthrown and killed. 4 later change his name to "Mobutu Sese Seko") eventually took control of the government and launched a three-decade reign of tyranny and kleptocracy from which the country is still trying to recover.' 5 As noted above, it has been mired in armed conflict ever since.1 6 Independent elections in 2006" 7 and peace initiatives that concluded last year in Nairobi" 8 and Goma" 9 have improved the situation and given the country a modicum of hope for an end to the violence and the development of the rule of law. 20 But this fragile state of affairs has not ended the mass atrocity and it will not hold without significant outside assistance. 2 1 In this regard, the United States, under the leadership of new President Barack Obama, must play a decisive role. 2 2 Other potential do- 19. The "Goma Agreement" was the result of the Goma conference on peace, security, and development for the Kivu provinces held this past January. The Acts of Engagement which provided for an immediate ceasefire among the armed groups in the area, demobilization of militias, and the acceleration of the peace process were signed on 21. The primary assistors would likely be the United States, the European Union ("EU"), the African Union and the United Nations ("U. The European Union ("EU"), for example, due to various bureaucratic and financial restraints, is limited in the extent of effective assistance it can render. 2 4 The African Union has been trying to keep the peace in Darfur, but has been lacking sufficient money and supplies. 25 It is in no position to shoulder the massive burden in DR Congo. Nor is the United Nations ("U.N."), which is overextended in the field of humanitarian as-
26
sistance.
While the United States has at times exerted a positive influence in the DR Congo peace and rebuilding process in recent years," its involvement has not been sufficient to bring about 2009 .state.gov/s/p/rem/31299.htm (suggesting the dominant role played by the United States in humanitarian assistance given that the United States alone was responsible for one-third of all global humanitarian assistance in 2003).
23. It might be argued that, with current commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is already stretched too thin to take on this commitment. See But what exactly can the United States do to promote the rule of law and human rights in DR Congo? This Article contends that U.S.-DR Congo policy has been formulated in dribs and drabs, limited in quantity relative to the enormity of the crisis, and without an overarching plan for promoting legal coherence and yielding long-term, systemic change. To be effective, U.S.-Congolese policy must be crafted and executed with a holistic approach-security, disarmament, infrastructure, food assistance, and health care must all undergird greater efforts to establish the rule of law. In effect, the United States must initiate an "African Marshall Plan"-a massive resource and assistance infusion to bring about wide-ranging, organic change and secure With respect to the procedural side, U.S. policy is currently formulated by a smorgasbord of agencies in an ad hoc manner. 3 4 Creation of a single Congo working group or agency with an integrated agenda and a presence on the ground will bring much needed reform. It will allow the United States to formulate benchmarks in assessing the human rights situation in the country and better identify potential external partners, such as the EU, to end the atrocity crime wave in DR Congo. Moreover, using a U.S. ombudsman to assure that assistance is distributed by non-corrupt persons in an effective manner on the ground will 32. The "Marshall Plan"-more formally known as the "European Recovery Program"-was a project instituted by the United States after World War II to foster economic recovery and promote peace in Europe. It took its form in aJune 5, 1947 speech when U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall urged European countries to make decisions regarding their "economic needs so that material and financial aid from the United States could be integrated on a broad scale." Marshall Plan, in THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 106 (5th ed. 1993). The following year, President Truman created the Economic Cooperation Administration to administer the program. From 1948-51, over US$12 billion was dispersed to western European countries under the program. The Marshall Plan greatly contributed to the economic recovery of Europe and helped promote peace and stability in the region. See id.
33. This would certainly not be an exact replica of the original Marshall Plan but the term is used here to convey the notion of large-scale, holistic assistance to a region that has recently been devastated by war. Although the entire continent would not receive assistance under the plan, it is referred to as an "African" Marshall Plan because of the geographic and political centrality of DR Congo to the entire continent. also be a necessary part of the reform effort. Finally, to guarantee proper local coordination and efficiency, the United States should establish a permanent cadre of expert on-the-ground staff to sustain U.S. engagement in curbing human rights abuses and establishing the rule of law.
Substantively, three important features of U.S. policy in promoting the rule of law must be addressed: (1) eliminating the so-called "negative forces" in the region, which entails militia disarmament, military integration of dissident groups, repatriation of extremist Hutu forces, inclusion of Rwanda in the process, and control of arms smuggling and illegal resource exploitation; (2) building up essential institutions in DR Congo, which includes expanding, reforming and participating in the U.N. peacekeeping mission (known by its French acronym, "MONUC") ,5 creating a DR Congo domestic human rights advisor office and a new Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and building up civil society, especially in the justice sector; and (3) ending impunity, which involves supporting the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), domestic and possibly hybrid tribunal prosecution efforts, and generally ensuring enforcement of human rights and humanitarian law.
As Western Europe needed a massive infusion of American assistance to lift itself from misery after World War II, DR Congo needs such an investment now. Anything short of that will leave it mired in its current predicament-the post-independence cycle of violence and suffering. 36 The end of the Cold War changed the U.S. political calculus in the region and Mobutu looked to the French for support, 4°w hile the United States began to consider the potential of other partnerships in the Great Lakes Region-ultimately forming ones with Uganda and Rwanda." By the beginning of 1994, Rwanda had become the regional focus as two decades of rule by Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana (also a French client) 42 was coming apart under the weight of economic problems and ethnic pressure from a conflict between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis-sparked by armed incursions by the Rwandan Patriotic Front ("RPF"), an expatriate Tutsi military force from Uganda."
Although the two sides attempted to form a compromise government through the Arusha Accords, powerful extremist Hutus were against this solution and an extremist Hutu militia, the Interahamwe, was being recruited, organized and armed with machetes. 4 4 On April 6, 1994, Habyarimana's airplane was shot down as he returned from negotiations in Arusha and Hutu extremists launched a well-planned genocide that resulted in the murder of approximately 800,000 Tutsis within a hundred days and sent shock waves throughout the region. 45 As the genocide was taking its grim course, the RPF (which began to receive U.S. support) 4 6 was winning on the battlefield and the Rwandan Armed Forces (assisted by the French) 4 " began to retreat. 48 Eventually, a mass exodus of Rwandan Hutus poured over the borders into neighboring countries 49 [Vol. 32:1361 the RPF consolidated its control over Rwanda. 5 2 Also during this time, the refugee camps in Zaire became armed bases for crossborder killing missions into Rwanda, where ggnocidaire leaders hoped to carry on their eliminationist mission, silence witnesses, and destabilize RPF control over the country. 5 3 In due course, these leaders began to prepare for an invasion of Rwanda that would defeat the RPF and restore to them control over the country.5 4
B. The First Civil War: 1996-1997
At the same time, new ethnic tensions were flaring up in the eastern part of Zaire. Banyamulenge Tutsi (Zairian/Congolese Tutsi) were coming under attack from the Hutu refugee camps and were being subjected to various human rights violations by the Zairian government, including loss of property, arrest, and murder. 5 5 Armed and assisted by the RPF (again, with U.S. support), the Banyamulenge launched attacks against the camps, which ultimately resulted in their being dismantled, and then they carried the fight towards Kinshasa. 5 6 They were joined by other disaffected groups, including leftists who had supported Patrice Lumumba, as well as ethnic and regional minorities opposed to the dominance of the Kinshasa region. 5 7 Laurent D~sir6 Kabila, an ethnic Katangese, former Lumumba lieutenant, and leftist political leader, had been fighting the Mobutu government for decades and became the leader of the uprising that was starting to control large swaths of terri- tory in its march toward Kinshasa. 5 " Known as the Alliance des Forces D~mocratiques pour la Lib6ration du Congo-Zaire ("AFDL"), the rebellion was supported, militarily and financially, by Rwanda and Uganda, 9 which, in turn, were both supported by the United States. 6° In the end, the AFDL toppled Mobutu and the country's name was changed back to the "Democratic Republic of the Congo."61
The Banyamulenge and their Rwandan, Burundian, and Ugandan allies counted on the Rwandan military for protection against hostile armed groups operating in the eastern part of DR Congo. 62 These groups included:
(1) The Interahamwe; (2) The former Rwandan Armed Forces ("RAF"), which had fought the RPF during the Rwandan genocide;
(3) The Mai Mai, a rag-tag coalition of traditional Congolese local defense forces, which opposed the Rwandan incursion;
(4) The Alliance of Democratic Forces ("AFDL"), consisting of Ugandan expatriates who were fighting their motherland with the support of the government of Sudan; and (5) Various Burundian Hutu groups fighting the Tutsi-controlled government of Burundi. 6 3 The United States at first backed Kabila's government.
4
But the support did not last. After gaining power, Kabila sought independence from Rwanda and Uganda and asked them to remove their military contingents. 6 5 Both countries refused. [Vol. 32:1361
Rwanda felt it needed to deal with ongoing Interahamwe and RAF attacks launched from DR Congo 67 and Uganda was honoring its alliance with Rwanda and also believed that the AFDL still posed a serious threat as it was using DR Congo as a base. 6 " So Kabila's relationship with the Rwandans and Ugandans, as well as their backers from the United States, deteriorated. 6 9 C. The Second Civil War: 1998 War: -2003 War broke out again in 1998.70 This time, Kabila allied himself with Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia-and to a certain extent with Chad, Libya, and Sudan. 7 Facing them were Rwanda and Uganda-along with Burundi, to a certain extent-and the rebel groups these countries supported. 72 The Rwandan-backed rebel group known as the Rassemblement Congolais pour la D6mocra-tie ("RCD"), immediately went on the offensive. 7 ' After its initial advance on Kinshasa was turned back, it retreated to the eastern portion of the country, where it instituted effective control over expanses of that region and continued to fight the DR Congo Army and its foreign allies. Eventually, DR Congo was partitioned into three more or less separate zones with the RCD/Rwanda largely controlling the country's eastern sector, the MLC/Uganda occupying its northern third, and Congolese forces and their foreign allies asserting dominion over the balance. 7 7 A stalemate ensued. 7 8
The Lusaka Accord
In July 1999, in Lusaka, Zambia, all six main belligerents (Angola, DR Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) agreed to a cease-fire that was signed by the end of August. 79 In addition to the cease-fire, the Lusaka Accord called for: (1) deploying a U.N. peacekeeping operation ("MONUC") 8°; (2) withdrawing foreign troops; (3) establishing a Joint Verification Commission (financed by the United States and designed to track compliance with the Accord); and (4) launching an "InterCongolese Dialogue" with the objective of forming a transitional government leading to elections. 8 1 The Lusaka Accord signatories "failed to fully to implement its provisions in 1999 and 2000. " 182 In the meantime, the international community became increasingly critical of Laurent Kabila's efforts to thwart full deployment of MONUC troops, block attempts to engage in a meaningful Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and stifle any burgeoning political movements within the country. 8 ratified by all parties on April 2, 2003 in Sun City, South Africa (it is thus also known as the "Sun City Accord")." The United States played an important role in the diplomacy that culminated in this agreement. The agreement provided the framework for DR Congo's transition to democracy, 9 5 including establishment of a much criticized Truth and Reconciliation Commission that failed to provide for adequate representation of the belligerent parties and the most prominent victim group-women and girls. 9 6 During this time, the United States also took the lead in the U.N. Security Council and became one of the largest financial contributors to MONUC (which continues today). 
The Interahamwe
The remaining Interahamwe feared returning to Rwanda, convinced they would be targeted by vengeful Tutsi.°2 These Hutu extremists "remained in the forests of east Congo, preying on villages for food and money. ' 10 
Laurent Nkunda
In addition, one of the groups that had been fighting in the war, the Rwandan-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma ("RCD-Goma"), was committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in eastern DR Congo's Kivu region. During the fighting, Nkunda's troops, alleged by some to be taking orders from Rwanda,"°9 reportedly carried out war crimes, killing and raping civilians and looting their property. 1 0 Nkunda, whose Tutsi rebel faction renamed itself the National Congress for the Defense of the People ("CNDP"), was indicted for war crimes by the Congolese government in September 
2005.111

Ethnic Massacres in Ituri Province
Also during this 2003-2005 period, rival militias backed by Rwanda (supporting the Union of Congolese Patriots ("UPC")) and Uganda (sponsoring the Nationalist and Integrationist  Front ("FNI") ) created instability in the northeastern region of Ituri, as they battled over border trade and mining of mineral resources.
1 12 At the same time, Ituri also experienced mass ethnic violence between the region's agriculturalist Lendu and its pastoralist Hema ethnic groups. 113 The Lendu ethnicity was largely represented by the FNI militia, while the UPC militia claimed to be fighting for the Hema. 4 The violence between these groups was intensified by a "borrowing" of ethnic ideology from the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda. Lendu In 2004, to stem the tide of regional violence and instability during this period, the United States helped launch the so-called "tripartite process," resulting in the creation of the "Tripartite Plus Joint Commission," consisting of Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. 1 8 The Commission was formed to help these countries work together cooperatively to resolve their problems and to support and enhance regional security." 9
Elections
After suffering through this difficult period, general elections were held in DR Congo on July 30, 2006, the first multiparty elections in the country in forty-six years. 120 Congolese citizens went to the polls to elect both a new president and National Assembly, the lower-house of the Parliament. 1 21 A run-off contest was then held on October 29, 2006 and Joseph Kabila was elected as DR Congo president. 22 The United States provided the initial support to launch the Congolese Independent Election Commission and it sent observers to both rounds of national elections.123
II. CONGO IN THE AFTERMATH OF ELECTIONS AND U.S. POLICY DURING THIS TIME
A. Post-Election Human Rights Violations
Although the official end of the war and elections brought a certain degree of peace to DR Congo, in many respects the war never ended. 124 The post-2003 armed conflict and large-scale human rights abuses already described were symptomatic of the kind of violence that continued to rage throughout the country, Early in 2007, combatants loyal to Nkunda were integrated into the national army in a process called "mixage."127 Unfortunately, the newly established "mixed" brigades killed scores of civilians and committed rapes and other abuses in their operations against the AFDL.
128 By August 2007, the political agreements had collapsed and many of Nkunda's former troops returned to his control. Renewed clashes between Nkunda's troops and government soldiers followed. In the latter part of 2008, after a brief respite, Nkunda launched a new offensive against government forces that resulted in the eventual encirclement of Goma. 1 3 The fighting forced more than a quarter of a million people from their homes. Its top leaders, including chief Joseph Kony, have been indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity and war crimes.' 3 9 As the LRA's operating space in Uganda has increasingly shrunk, it has turned its attention to DR Congo, where, since late December 2008, it has murdered over 500 people and forced over 100,000 to flee their homes to avoid attacks while it abducts children to serve as soldiers.
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Issues lying below the surface, including questions about militia disarmament, army reform, justice for atrocity victims, and the illegal exploitation of mineral wealth have not been effectively resolved and continue to wreak havoc. 141 In many respects, mineral exploitation and its attendant problems have As a result, over a million Congolese people in North and South Kivu provinces are still displaced and remain too frightened to go home. 4 7 The situation for women and girls has been especially dire. At least 60,000 Congolese females along the entire age spectrum have been raped by militia groups or soldiers from the DR Congo army.' 4 8 Sadly, little girls have in no way been spared. Four-thousand of the rape victims in one province, for example, consisted of children. Armed groups also continue to press children into military service. Consequently, DR Congo has among the highest numbers of child soldiers in the world.
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B. The Nairobi-Goma Peace Process
In November 2007, the United States helped facilitate an accord between DR Congo and Rwanda (known as the "Nairobi CommuniquC') that is designed to tackle problems related to the presence of the AFDL in the Kivus. On January 23, 2008, after weeks of negotiation, a ceasefire agreement ("Goma Agreement") was signed by DR Congo government officials and twenty-two armed groups in the eastern town of Goma. 152 As before, United States participation was critical to the successful outcome. The Agreement also established a Joint Technical Committee on Peace and Security ("Goma Committee"), a monitoring body that will help iron out certain details related to troop disengagement. 55 The Committee, which held its first official meeting on April 3, 2008, has fielded representatives from all the armed factions in the conflict. "6 It is jointly chaired by the Congolese government and representatives of the international community, including the United States. 5 7 In addition, International and Congolese non-governmental organizations seek to create an independent special advisor for human rights. This office could play an essential role in assisting the Committee as it tackles the thorny human rights issues that will inevitably arise during implementation of the Goma Agreement. About seventy percent of these funds were allocated for programs that support the Act's humanitarian and social development objectives, while the remainder was targeted for programs and activities that support the Act's economic, governance, and security objectives.
16 2 For example, USAID is making available humanitarian assistance that includes emergency supplies, food, water, and sanitation improvements to vulnerable populations. 163 The Department of Treasury has worked to furnish the country with interim debt relief. 164 And the Department of State has been tasked with providing training and other assistance aimed at professionalizing members of DR Congo's military. 65 
December 2008 Assistance Funds
On December 18, 2008, the United States approved the release of an additional US$6 million in aid for refugees and people displaced by the violence in eastern DR Congo. 166 These funds are to be used to provide emergency relief commodities, and address humanitarian protection needs. 167 This includes donating simple commodities such as blankets, water buckets, mosquito nets, and kitchen sets; registering and relocating people who have been displaced; and addressing the needs of women and children who have been victims of sexual violence.1 68 Nevertheless, despite these efforts to comfort victims and establish civil society in DR Congo, and apart from the violence directly caused by Nkunda's latest offensive, the U.N. and others have reported that over the last year scores of Congolese civilians [Vol. 32:1361 have been deliberately killed, executed, or "disappeared," some of them children. 1 6 9 Officials report that at least 500 women and girls were raped. This figure is in all likelihood much higher as the reported number only reflects those who reached a clinic for medical treatment. 17° By way of example, each month since January 2008 at least fifty women and girls have been reported raped in the town of Shabunda (South Kivu province).1' Clearly, the violence associated with the overall armed conflict and the absence of valid, functioning social institutions has persisted. 72 And still this does not include the recent brutalities inflicted by the Lord's Resistance Army, which U.S. policy has not even had a chance to address.
III. RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY TO PROMOTE THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
DR Congo appears to have reached a critical juncture in its tumultuous history. After years of suffering under dictatorship and a series of devastating internal and regional armed conflicts, it has installed its first democratically elected government in more than forty years. 1 7 3 And while the United States bears significant responsibility for many of DR Congo's past problems, the United States has partially atoned for its sins by playing an important role in the fall of the Mobutu regime and helping to negotiate the end of the post-Mobutu wars, promote regional security, facilitate elections, provide humanitarian assistance, and nurture DR Congo's fledgling democracy. But these efforts have not achieved the desired goal of ending DR Congo's internal armed conflicts and atrocities and establishing a stable society. But what more can the United States do to promote peace and prosperity in DR Congo? The answer lies in both procedural and substantive changes to U.S. policy. This should lead to a massive infusion of assistance that can be thought of as an "Afri- 
A. Procedural Policy Reforms
Procedurally, the United States needs to formulate a more coherent and unified policy regarding DR Congo. Part of this will entail coordinating its various and scattered agency activities. There has been some recent progress in this regard as the National Security Council has established an interagency group, including the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury, to help discuss DR Congo policies and approaches and coordinate certain agency activities.175 However, this group does not include other agencies that contribute to U.S. assistance efforts (such as the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, or Labor) or other agencies that could make important contributions (such as the Department of Justice).176
Moreover, since the U.S. government has not established a process to assess systematically its overall progress in DR Congo, it cannot accurately determine whether it has distributed its resources in the most effective manner. Nor, for that matter, can it determine whether it is earmarking sufficient resources for the Congolese. In this regard, benchmarks are essential to evaluate progress with respect to the Congolese human rights situation.'
77 Formulation of such reference points, thus, must be an integral part of U.S. procedural policy reform.
In addition to promoting internal coherence and efficiency, the proposed coordination process could help the United States identify additional bilateral or multilateral measures that would contribute to success in its DR Congo policy. What partners would be most effective in working with the United States in effecting holistic change that will lead to the end of atrocities in DR Congo? Should the United States focus on spearheading initiatives with the EU, the African Union, the U.N., or all three? Or can other partners be identified? How can the United States best coordinate with these partners? Put simply, internal U.S. coordination will help work out these external issues and promote superior transnational coordination. [Vol. 32:1361
Finally, procedural reform in delivery of U.S. assistance to DR Congo also entails effective monitoring and quality control of allocation and distribution of aid and assistance. Given the long-standing and pervasive culture of corruption in DR Congo, 7 8 successful aid delivery is currently jeopardized by the malfeasance of official Congolese recipients. An American ombudsman or other oversight mechanism should be implemented to prevent this from happening.
Similarly, the United States should have a permanent presence on the ground to coordinate its participation in all peace and stabilization efforts. It has already made some progress in that regard. In September 2007, it appointed senior conflict advisor Tim Shortley to support peace efforts in eastern DR Congo.
17 9 It should go further by establishing permanent offices in the Kivus (where a majority of human rights violations are currently taking place) and Kinshasa-with full-time staff from USAID and the Department of State, among others-to sustain U.S. engagement in curbing human rights abuses and establishing the rule of law throughout the country."' 0
B. Substantive Policy Reforms
Were this procedural reform to be instituted, the United States could start to address some of the serious substantive issues plaguing its DR Congo policy. To begin with, U.S. strategy currently emphasizes humanitarian aid at the expense of law sector reform. However, there is a good argument for shifting the policy focus to rule of law and security sector reform. In the absence of legal norms and safety, the country is simply incapable of developing its civil society and the United States is in any event hindered in delivering humanitarian assistance. Law and order must be the first order of business.
But what concrete measures could the United States take to help institute law and order in this largely anarchic country and its surrounding region? As mentioned above, there are three areas in which reform could lead to significant progress: eliminat- ing the so-called "negative forces" in the region, building up essential institutions in DR Congo, and ending impunity.
Eliminating "Negative Forces"
In general, for those who work on DR Congo issues, the "negative forces" are the militias, rebel groups, and criminal Congolese government military and security personnel that have participated in mass murder, large-scale sexual violence (wherein tens of thousands of Congolese women and girls have been raped), and numerous other human rights violations. In the short-term, the United States must direct a large portion of its investment in DR Congo to eliminating these forces. This can be achieved through four objectives: providing additional support for the ongoing (and often ineffective) Disarmament, Demobilization & Repatriation ("DDR") program and the military integration process; seeking Rwandan support for these initiatives; preventing the free flow of arms into DR Congo; and preventing illegal resource exploitation, which has both fueled and financed the negative forces.
a. Demilitarization & Integration
Demilitarization entails both disarming and demobilizing combatants and then reintegrating them into society.' It isjustified by the tendency of combatants to upset and jeopardize the peace process by initiating fresh hostilities with their former opponents or by using their weapons to perpetrate garden variety crimes.
18 2 And an essential component of demilitarization involves providing monetary incentives to help spur combatant reintegration into society."' Thus, in DR Congo, combatants have been given the choice of either entering into civilian life or joining the Forces Arnes de la Rpublique Democratique du Congo ("FARDC") .184 [Vol. 32:1361 Owing to the complexities of the Congolese war, the government and international community have had to deal with both Congolese and foreign armed groups and militias. Congolese armed groups have been undergoing the DDR process.'1 5 Foreign armed groups, on the other hand, have been undergoing the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, or resettlement ("DDRRR") process.
1 6
Pursuant to the Nairobi Communiqu6 (also known as the Nairobi Action Plan) and the Goma Agreement, MONUC DDRRR teams have redoubled efforts, working jointly with Congolese authorities, to educate Rwandan combatants about the DDRRR process."' This public awareness campaign is designed to enhance combatant appreciation of the tangible social and economic opportunities open to those who surrender their weapons and choose voluntary repatriation to Rwanda.'
Although it is the linchpin of efforts to restore order in eastern DR Congo, it has proceeded at a snail's pace and lacks sufficient personnel and materiel. 9 Ongoing military clashes between and among the FARDC, the CNDP, the AFDL, and the Mai Mai demonstrate that the DDRRR process is far from complete and that the Congolese government still faces formidable challenges in disarming and demobilizing these volatile elements in the Kivus.
The United States, coordinating with other significant donors such as the EU, would do well to make substantial resource contributions to this effort as foreign combatants play a significant role in the current violence and human rights violations in the east. With the success of the DDRRR process, a secure eastern DR Congo will provide the basis for stabilizing the rest of the country, instituting the rule of law, and ending the large-scale human rights abuses.
But for stability to take root in eastern DR Congo (and the rest of the country, for that matter), the DDR process must also come to fruition. Remaining renegade rank-and-file Congolese troops, which also commit atrocities in eastern DR Congo and elsewhere, must be neutralized, brought to justice (where appropriate), effectively integrated into the FARDC or returned to civilian life. It will be crucial then, to assure that stabilization efforts not focus entirely on the Kivus. Brutality still reigns in other parts of the country, such as Bas-Congo, where Congolese police have inflicted deadly violence on members of the Bundu Dia Kongo politico-religious movement since January 2008.90 For those ex-combatants who choose to reintegrate into civilian life, sufficient social and economic infrastructure to absorb and sustain them will be the order of the day.' 9 1 This is especially true for child ex-combatants-they are the future of DR Congo and they must be properly educated and embraced by the community.
And those who opt to join the FARDC should expect to work for a professional, well-structured fighting force that respects international humanitarian and human rights law. Expending additional resources toward professionalization of the FARDC is therefore critical. There must be an appreciable increase in U.S. investment for this essential process, which has also been hindered by shortages of both men and money.' Demobilization of the Hutu combatants clearly requires the support and participation of Rwanda,1 93 a participant/signatory in the Nairobi and Goma processes. Nevertheless, until recently, Rwanda was still being accused of providing covert assistance to Nkunda' 9 4 and generally failing to take seriously its Nairobi Communiqu6 obligations.' 9 5 Although its nascent cooperation with DR Congo led to Nkunda's recent arrest, it is not clear whether Rwanda intends to hand over the renegade general to face justice in Kinshasa.' 9 6 For the effective functioning of the Goma/Nairobi processes in general, and the DDRRR process in particular, greater cooperation from Rwanda remains indispensable.
Moreover, the rebel Hutus must have legitimate incentives to return to Rwanda. This will require that Rwanda ensure returning Hutus are treated fairly and given social and economic opportunities (although gnocidaires have to be brought to justice). 19 7 To the extent Rwanda requires continuing or expanded financial support for these efforts, it should be furnished by the United States. Additionally, given its long-standing alliance with and support of Rwanda, the United States is in a unique position to influence Rwanda's domestic and foreign policy to conform with all U.S. regional peace and stability initiatives, as reflected in the Goma/Nairobi processes.
c. Working to Stop Arms Transfers and Smuggling
The international community must also improve the oversight and enforcement of the free flow of arms in DR Congo and throughout the Great Lakes region. The U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution regarding a comprehensive arms trade treaty in December 2006.19' Unfortunately, the United States voted against this resolution. 1 9 9 More recently, in a call for country views on an arms trade treaty, ninety-four countries submitted their views before the June 20, 2007 deadline.
2 0 0 Once again, the United States abdicated responsibility by failing to submit its view. 20 1 Given U.S. domination of the global arms transfer industry, 2 2 such a laissez-faire approach undermines larger American peace objectives for the Congolese. In fact, the United States should be the catalyst for regional reform by developing and supporting relevant legal initiatives and by providing funding and manpower to control arms transfers and smuggling in DR Congo and neighboring countries.
d. Preventing Illegal Resource Exploitation
Much of DR Congo's armed conflict has been fueled and financed by illicit trade in minerals and other natural resources. 20 3 Currently, much of that activity is taking place in North and South Kivu, where militias operate with the incentive of personal enrichment primarily through control of mining areas and exploitation of their resources (which also pays for the internecine violence) .
2 4 Extracted minerals are being purchased and exploited by U.S. companies to manufacture everything from cell phones to gas turbine airplane engines. 2°5 American companies that take advantage of these illicit, low-priced commodities should be fined, sanctioned, and possibly prosecuted by the U.S. government. This will go a long way toward reducing the motivation and sustenance of negative forces in DR Congo. Moreover, the United States should assist the Congolese government in creating legislative means to ensure that profits from exploitation of natural resources be equitably distributed to local communities. 20 6 
Establishing Positive Forces
In addition to backing efforts to eradicate negative forces in the region, the United States must also make significant contributions toward establishing positive forces in DR Congo. There are three primary building efforts on which to focus: expanding and strengthening MONUC, establishing a human rights infrastructure, and building up civil society.
a. MONUC
Although it runs the world's most expensive peacekeeping operation, 2 " 7 MONUC's current force levels do not permit effective implementation of the Goma/Nairobi peace process. 20 8 MONUC's resources are being stretched beyond capacity, which jeopardizes the often fragile or eroding equilibrium established in high-tension areas such as Bas Congo. 20 9 Quite simply, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a force of fewer than 20,000 to provide stability to a country the size of Western Europe. 210 Elsewhere, far more troops have been deployed in much smaller countries with similar problems. In Liberia, for example, whose entire surface area is little more than one average Congolese district, roughly 15,000 U.N. peacekeeping troops have been placed in service. And Burundi, DR Congo's postage-stamp-size neighbor to the east, has received approximately 5000.211 MONUC quite obviously needs to muster troop numbers compatible with the enormous size of DR Congo and capable of handling the commensurately large security challenges it faces. In addition to providing extra cash for MONUC, the United States should actually contribute troops. Well trained, well disciplined American military personnel could make a significant difference in empowering MONUC to fulfill its Herculean task.
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Much like the Marshall Plan, perhaps it is time to start thinking of MONUC as the beginning of a new kind of North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Africa.
Part of this should entail the United States ensuring that all MONUC personnel are properly trained and that any found engaging in violations of human rights or humanitarian laws be swiftly and appropriately punished. U.S. financing and participation should be contingent on imposition of such conditions. Finally, resources should be consecrated to instituting effective outreach programs for MONUC to promote a positive image among Congolese civilians and those in arms. This is critical in [Vol. 32:1361 light of, inter alia, the crimes (including sexual violence) allegedly committed by MONUC personnel 1 4 and discontent with MONUC, as demonstrated by recent riots in eastern DR Congo. 2 1 5 A public outreach campaign will go a long way toward ameliorating public perception of MONUC and thereby make it a much more effective force.
b. Security Sector Reform
In addition to DDR, DDRRR, and integration, DR Congo needs a global approach to security sector reform that includes more than the army. 216 Of course, national and local police forces must also be given adequate training and resources. 2 1 7 In addition, the intelligence sector, border control, and customs should also be studied and upgraded to achieve internal efficacy and meaningful integration with the military and police forces. 1 8 c. National Human Rights Office
As mentioned previously, international and Congolese human rights and aid groups hope that an independent special advisor for human rights can be established to assist the Goma Committee deal with DR Congo's ongoing human rights is- 
d. Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Experts have noted that "to restore the social fabric of the [DR Congo], some form of truth-telling will be necessary."220 The United States should bankroll the establishment and operation of a new Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC"). As alluded to above, the Sun City TRC, which never heard a single case, failed because it did not provide for proper representation of the belligerent parties and placed the perpetrators' interests ahead of the victims'. 2 2 1 In particular, women and girls, who have borne the brunt of Congolese internecine civilian violence, should exercise a leadership role in setting up any future TRC and have a more prominent voice in its proceedings. In the absence of genuine efforts to rebuild Congolese civil society, the measures listed above will be of little to no avail. In addition to governmental, commercial, and medical infrastructure and services, civic participation at all levels must be encouraged and permitted to flourish. 2 2 3 Internally displaced persons and refugees must be resettled and given assistance. 2 2 4 Corruption must be systematically rooted out. 22 5 Investment in a long-term development strategy is essential. This will require the maintenance, improvement, and significant expansion of such American efforts as the DR Congo Act. 226 For purposes of instituting and preserving peace, enforcing the rule of law is paramount and so the judicial sector stands out as perhaps the top priority in this area. It must be furnished with adequate personnel, resources, and training. In this regard, [Vol. 32:1361 two sections of the U.S. Department of Justice could provide invaluable assistance. The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program ("ICITAP") 227 could send experts to provide specialized training to various Congolese law enforcement branches. 2 2 8 Similarly, the Office of Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training ("OPDAT") could supply a resident legal advisor to Kinshasa to help with rebuilding the justice sector.
22 ' Together, these two agencies could team up to accomplish, inter alia, the following: (1) establish community justice projects that improve coordination between police, prisons, and courts; (2) institute anti-corruption programs; and (3) set up a Women's Justice and Empowerment Initiative that seeks to improve the government's ability to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate DR Congo's rampant gender-based crimes. 230 
Ending Impunity
As the preceding paragraphs make clear, there can be no peace without justice in DR Congo. For the cycles of violence and war to abate, perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide must be held to account for their offenses. Moreover, human rights and humanitarian law must be strictly enforced to prevent commission of such crimes in the future.
The United States can and should play a crucial role in both regards.
a. Supporting Prosecution Efforts i. International Criminal Court
The ICC investigations and prosecutions of Ituri warlords could represent an important step in ending the culture of impunity that has pervaded in DR Congo. By its absence from the ICC, the United States is hampering a crucial Congolese human rights initiative.231 In addition to assuring more effective results for existing investigations and prosecutions, U.S. participation could help facilitate ICC investigations related to crimes in other parts of the country and committed by high-level perpetrators in the government, military, and other sectors of society. For example, it is perhaps time for the ICC to indict Laurent Nkunda given DR Congo's collapsed judicial sector. Clearly, as indicated above, Ituri is not the only area where atrocities have been committed over the past decade. Moreover, U.S. support could help the ICC in the arrest and prosecution of indicted LRA leaders, including chief Joseph Kony, whose forces have been committing atrocities in DR Congo since late last year. 2 3 2 ii. Domestic Prosecutions As a corollary, DR Congo domestic prosecution efforts must also be buttressed. If he is not indicted by the ICC (and extradited to DR Congo), Nkunda is the poster child for this necessity. As mentioned above, U.S. agencies such as ICITAP and OPDAT could lend significant assistance. These agencies could spearhead efforts to place resources in the proper hands for justice sector rebuilding efforts. Further, the United States could establish various programs, such as the State Department's "Rewards for Justice" program (already used effectively in Africa to apprehend Rwandan gnocidaires on the lam) to help capture DR Congo fugitives. Committing U.S. troops to MONUC would certainly help shore up enforcement of both human rights and humanitarian law in DR Congo-an essential part of imposing and sustaining the rule of law there. Even absent that, the United States should provide assistance in training MONUC and Congolese troops in the law of war. This would certainly help reduce victimization of civilians and stem a rampant culture of predation.
CONCLUSION
During the first phase of Congolese independence, U.S. policy was clearly dominated by narrow Cold War interests. But as this Article has demonstrated, that policy has evolved over the past decade. Although the United States has at times had divergent objectives (including resource exploitation) and problematic partners (including, most notably, Rwanda and Uganda) in the Great Lakes Region during the previous ten years, its goal of helping DR Congo emerge from the rubble of Mobutuism and civil war has gained greater urgency and become a more prominent and fixed part of U.S. strategy.
2 36 Considering that 45,000 human beings still perish every month due to conflict in DR Congo, it is high time that goal be completely achieved. Not only is it the right thing to do and the best policy from a humanitarian perspective, it is in the U.S. and global interest that a country the size of Western Europe, lying at the heart of the African continent, attain stability. 2 3 7 As the New York Times has noted, "When Congo shakes, Africa trembles. 23 8 This Article has made a case for the United States implementing with all due speed an "African Marshall Plan"-a mammoth infusion of resources and assistance. 239 This program should be administered by a well-integrated, single agency or office within the U.S. government and use an ombudsman to insure proper allocation and distribution of resources. As the original aid initiative helped Western Europe cling to peace and democracy after the Second World War, the "African Marshall Plan" should provide the same benefits for DR Congo in the wake of Africa's "First World War." This behemoth of a country is truly at a crossroads in its history. So is the United States as it enters a new era with the presidency of Barack Obama, who was born to an African father the year Lumumba was murdered with American complicity. 2 4° Perhaps the United States can now come full circle. For it is still not too late for Patrice Lumumba's vision of an independent, secure and prosperous Democratic Republic of Congo to be realized. If that is to happen, the spirit of Lumumba and Marshall must now come together for the birth of a new central Africa. 
